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Dominions of surrogate opinions: who is
in charge?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Lawrence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexA man with one watch knows what time it is; a man with
two watches is never quite sure.
- Lee Segall
A week ago you successfully repaired an acute aorto-
duodenal fistula in Mr. R. O. Under. He was alert on admis-
sion but now remains ventilator dependent and comatose.
The criteria for neurological death have not been met. He is
married and has several grown children. His second wife and
he have not been together for 5 years. He has been living with
another woman for several months. They intend to marry
when his divorce is final. His children have been frequent
visitors to the bedside. His wife called this morning and insists
that life support be discontinued; his first wife agrees. The
patient lives in Texas but not his exes. A close friend insists the
patient would not want to live this way and that the patient
wanted him to be the surrogate but did not put it in writing.
His children and live-in girlfriend adamantly insist that therapy
be continued. The patient has a properly executed DNR
expressing that if in comahedidnotwish resuscitation.Whose
instructions should be followed?
A. Follow the wishes of the girlfriend.
B. Follow the wishes of the wife.
C. Follow the wishes of his children.
D. Follow the wishes of the ex-wife.
E. Follow the advice of the friend.
Surrogates are helpful in making serious decisions most
of the time but they also can make the situation perplex-
ingly difficult.1 In the time of effortless medical ethics,
before the autonomy epidemic and the introduction of
living wills, and the rise of medical technology, decision
making was a binary yes/no with little associated hand
wringing. Most often, in difficult cases, surgeons told pa-
tients and relatives what they were going to do next and did
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cided when someone died and death was battled all out
until the resuscitation failed. The preamble at the meeting
to inform families of a death often started, “We did every-
thing possible but . . .”
Then as life-extending therapies became burdensome
both from their extending misery and chewing up re-
sources, patients’ rights advocates trotted in surgical auton-
omy and problems with surrogates surfaced.
Surrogate decision making has been accepted in law
and medical ethics for more than 3 decades and is therefore
very well established. Surrogate decisionmaking is required
when the patient has a court-appointed guardian after
being adjudicated incompetent or, when there is no guard-
ian (which is usually the case) and the patient is judged by
his or her attending physician to be unable to participate in
the informed consent process about his or her medical care.
In medical ethics and law, 2 standards guide surrogate
decision making.2 The priority standard is substituted judg-
ment: the surrogate should conscientiously attempt to make
the decision that the patient would make, based on the surro-
gate’s knowledge of the patient’s values, beliefs, and prefer-
ences.When the surrogate cannotmeet this standard, the best
interests standard applies: the surrogate should make a deci-
sion that protects and promotes the patient’s health-related
and other interests. The best interests standard does not
mandate continued life-sustaining treatment when discontin-
uation is indicated because of a very poor prognosis and
iatrogenic morbidity, pain, distress, and suffering are increas-
ing.
Theoretically, these standards are clear but humanity by
nature is subjectively vague. Surrogate decision makers
frequently do not understand the ICU status of the patients
they represent.3 Less than half, regardless of educational
level, had adequate knowledge of what was going on and
what would happen in the event of a cardiac arrest. Non-
English-speakers had even worse knowledge. Nurses’ ex-
planations were better understood than physicians’ explana-
tions. Reasons surrogates gave for the ICU communication
problems were the explanation was too hurried, the explana-
tion was too complicated, and the explanation was too emo-
tionally upsetting.
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that an incredible 88% of family members of critically ill
patients doubted the physician’s prognosis.4 Some har-
bored a belief that God would alter the course of the illness;
others believed that predicting the future is inherently
uncertain, remembering prior experiences where physi-
cians’ prognostications were inaccurate.
Surrogate decisions that inaccurately represent the pa-
tient’s wishes, provided the surgeon has a basis for reason-
able certainty that the surrogate is mistaken, do not meet
the substituted judgment standard. These decisions are
therefore not ethically binding on the surgeon. Surrogate
decision-making fails to reflect the patient’s wishes accu-
rately in 70% of important treatment issues.5 To address
this problem, the surgeon should ask the surrogate to relate
what he or she knows about the patient’s values, beliefs, and
preferences and the basis for this knowledge. Asking the
surrogate to report conversations with the patient that are
relevant to the decisions at hand can be very helpful in
satisfying the substituted judgment standard.
There are several problems in the present case concern-
ing surrogate decision making. First, the patient’s current
wife is legally his surrogate decision maker. No one else has
legal standing. Second, the surgeon knows only her deci-
sion, not its basis and thus whether it meets the substituted
judgment standard. Third, there are other reports on what
the patient’s decision would be and these might meet the
substituted judgment standard even if they come from
someone other than the patient’s current wife. In short,
there are too many surrogates and those most involved
disagree with the one who is higher on the legal preference
list.
The first step is to make it clear who has legal authority
to act as the surrogate decision maker. Texas, along with 14
other states and the District of Columbia, are common law
states where a cohabiting couple can be considered married
if the following criteria are met: they must live together for
a significant period of time (not defined in any state); hold
themselves out as a married couple – typically this means
using the same last name, referring to the other as “my
husband” or “my wife,” and filing a joint tax return; and
intend to be married. The patient, however, is still legally
married so his girlfriend cannot be his common-law wife.
She may have the best wishes of any participant, but this
gives her no legal standing. Option A is out, legally.
The ex-ex wife has even less legal standing than the
present near ex-wife, and perhaps time has healed some
wounds, but we can’t count on it. OptionD is out.Without
proof of the patient’s wishes, the friend has the least stand-
ing of those involved. His lack of standing emphasizes the
need for all adults to execute a living will to avoid the angst
that similar emergency situations can cause. Option E is
out, legally.
Option B is the correct legal option, insofar as desig-
nating the appropriate surrogate decision maker; she
should be informed that she has an ethical obligation to
make the decision that, on the basis of reliable knowledge
of her husband’s values, beliefs, and preferences, he wouldmake. Some states also make this the legally preferred
standard, Texas among them. Because she has not lived
with her husband for 5 years, she cannot report reliably on
his most recent values, beliefs, and preferences. She can,
however, report on what she knows of her husband’s
values, beliefs, and preferences when they were together
and she should be asked to do so. The patient’s girlfriend
can, however, report on his more recent values, beliefs, and
preferences. If in the surgeon’s judgment, the girlfriend’s
report meets the substituted judgment standard, then the
surgeon should ask the wife to endorse these and authorize
continued treatment.
If the patient’s wife declines to do so, then her request
to discontinue treatment loses ethical authority and, in
Texas, legal authority. The surgeon should immediately
contact institutional counsel to explore legal responses to
the wife’s failure to meet her ethical and legal obligation as
a surrogate decision maker in this case.
Although the legally correct answer is Option B, it is
confined to the issue of who is the legally designated
surrogate decision maker. However, the ethically correct
answer to this case is Option C; if the wife is unable to
faithfully represent her husband’s wishes, she should de-
cline the role of surrogate decisionmaker, in which case this
role passes by law to their children.
In a socially awkward situation such as this, the surgeon
would be wise to ask patients beforehand who should be
their surrogate decision maker, should the need arise.
This scenario in a less complicated format was sug-
gested by Dr. Julian E. Losanoff of John D. Dingell Veter-
ans Administration Medical Center of Detroit and the
Harper University Hospital.
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